-Katherine Mansfield to John Middleton Murry, April 7, 1920 2 This exchange of letters between Katherine Mansfield and John Middleton Murry hints at a story familiar to both writers and lovers: to negotiations over independence, to a desperate weighing of what is free against what must be paid for, to a pattern of rebukes followed by carefully calculated gifts. The letters are typical of the lovers' correspondence, which details a series of increasingly complex transactions between them regarding both how to get money (through allowances, loans, publications, work as a reviewer, an actress, a manicurist, even, very briefly, a kitchen help in a bombarded underground Paris kitchen) and how to spend money (on temporary homes, journeys, printing presses, dubious medicines, and the ever-ubiquitous flowers).
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The complexities of Mansfield's relationship to money were evident in the different meanings and names she gave to it. The money she gave to Murry was an "egg in the nest," a down payment on a fertile future that she knew that they were unlikely to share, whilst she imagined that Murry kept his own money in a "wild thyme bank," making her the Titania to his Oberon and the future a passionate but disturbed dream. 3 Her recurring fears about Murry's fidelity were reported as a nightmare in which he gives away the money he earns from writing, a nightmare from which she awakes "terrified lest this might happen. Never let it" because this money is his "blood. Never give it away." 4 The money given to her by the ever-loyal Ida Baker, however, is merely "T" (tea) because it is "such a comfort." 5 The meanings given to these different types of money indicate, of course, very different rates of exchange, rates that are affected as much by the psychodynamics of sexual desire as by the political and cultural dynamics of class, race, and gender. Murry's "blood" money is defined by restriction-it can only be exchanged for its full value with Mansfield-whereas the "tea" that flows between her and Baker is framed through a casual sociality that explicitly resists such exclusivities. Mansfield (living on a New Zealand-denominated allowance from her father and moving between Bavaria, England, France, and Italy in the 1910s and 1920s) also had a literal experience of such differential rates of exchange. Yet the accounts that her letters provide of these exchanges often suggest a surprisingly similar set of investments in them. Sometimes, for example, Baker would be sent to several different banks to accomplish a single transaction at maximum financial advantage whereas, at other times, Mansfield would lose money on the exchanges because Kay (the manager of the New Zealand Bank in London and a substitute for her own banking father for much of her adult life) "had taken such pains to arrange the matter and as he said 'tickle them up,'" a "[s]entimentality" which cost her "22 lire. It won't do. I always feel people's feelings are being hurt. I suppose they are not really & Im very silly." 6 Yet scholarship has had surprisingly little to say regarding both how modernists assigned symbolic meaning to money or what these symbolic meanings suggest about the larger issue of how the discipline itself understands money. Although the social and political relations of markets, publics, and institutions have been central to the past two decades of modernist studies, as figures such as Lawrence Rainey, Rachel Bowlby, and Joyce Piell Wexler have captured the complex ambivalence of modernist production and consumption, the overriding concern in this work has been with what money does rather than with what money is. 7 When this latter question does appear, the answer is frequently found in the somewhat tautological assumptions associated with what has come to be descried as the "New Economic Criticism" of the late 1990s: money is self-referential, like a language, and thus subject to the same crisis in representation that makes it unknowable outside of itself. In Jean Joseph Goux's seminal account of money and modernism, for example, gold is rendered equivalent to god, and the ending of the gold standard is analogous to the failure of linguistic reference. 8 It is an answer that speaks to the formal relationship between money and representation, allowing one to comprehend the recurring social anxieties that paper money provoked through 487 an analogy with the literary, but is also difficult to reconcile with the nuanced cultural and political changes in the money form itself that were taking place in the opening decades of the twentieth century.
It is these changes that I want to explore by proposing a reading of money located between cultural readings of the modernist marketplaces and formal readings of money as analogous to a language of diminished reference. I want to focus on how writers associated with modernism used money in ways that complicated its abstraction, the view of it as merely a "veil" for the "real" economy, which was being codified in the emerging social sciences of the 1910s and 1920s. By drawing on an alternative intellectual history for money, one that comes largely from anthropology and critical studies of finance rather than economics, I want to suggest that modernists such as Mansfield, Virginia Woolf, and John Maynard Keynes used money as a profoundly ironic form of resistance, rejecting its endless fungibility as an object of pure exchange and giving it specific meanings that called attention to the circumstances in which exchange itself could occur. Such representations suggest, then, a critical reading of money as a site not only of frictionless exchange, involving abstraction and alienation, but also of embedded and potentially resistant social meanings. The readings that follow emphasize how women modernists, in particular, used this duality to explore the limits of their political identities-particularly their fraught relationship to the kinds of cosmopolitan identity that were such a vital part of the politics and cultures of the modernist project.
Using the language of money to think about the limitations of cosmopolitanism is at once both a very literal and a very odd thing to do. Money might be said to have, like "cultural materials and cosmopolitan migrants [,] traveled to and through the western capitals with unprecedented mobility and inspiring aesthetic results," but the vocabulary for its movement is clearly never as celebratory. 9 The meaning of capital's movement across borders in the opening decades of the twentieth century requires a political and analytical register that rightly belongs, at least in the first instance, to Marx. For Marx, of course, it is in its movement across borders that money as capital is able to most fully realize its abstracted identity: when money "leaves the home sphere of circulation" it "strips off the local garbs which it there assumes" and gains "the shape of universal money. It is only in the markets of the world that money acquires to the full extent the character of the commodity whose bodily form is also the immediate social incarnation of human labour in the abstract." 10 The violent crises wrought by this "universal money," the managing of its inevitable cycles of expansion and contraction by the cartels that were forged between finance capital, industry, and the capitalist State, make up the history told by the imperial Marxism of the early twentieth century. This is money that produced, in a British context, what Giovanni Arrighi named as "free-trade imperialism" in which the "recycling of imperial tribute extracted from the colonies into capital invested all over the world" conferred massive political and economic power upon the City of London.
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Yet although it would be obviously foolhardy to dispute this political narrative for the movement of capital, the meaning that its tokens-money-was given cannot necessarily be entirely subsumed within it. Hence, Karl Polanyi's "Great Transformation" thesis, in 488 which money's abstraction is necessarily correlate with a social disembedding that we protect ourselves from acknowledging, has been both profoundly influential (not least on literary critics for whom "[m]oney's function as an interchangeable embodiment of pure quantity" is assumed to "efface" symbolic or social meaning) and the subject of increasing critical pressure from a variety of disciplines. 12 Anthropologists such as Bill Maurer have dubbed Polanyi's position a "Western folk theory of money" that tells only of "money's role in commensuration, abstraction, and quantification" and omits meanings that it possesses as "a social relation, a symbolic system, and a material reality." 13 Social critics of finance, such as Nigel Dodd and Martjin Konings, by contrast, focus on the paradoxes implied by these simultaneously held contradictory views of money, drawing out the tensions involved in viewing money as "a complex, relational construction" replete with social meanings and as "solid, objective fact" of exchange.
14 For many modernists, I want to argue, money existed through both of these definitions: it was both capital's abstract symbol of exchange and a material object, a repository of social and symbolic meanings capable of reimagining or even resisting these relations in complex and dialectical ways. I arrive at my reading of Mansfield's particularly acute ability to reflect on the contradictions this duality implies via two routes. In the first I review the parallel between money and language, often the implied centre of the literary readings of money in the homologous structures offered by "New Economic Criticism," by tracing it through its treatment in the work of Georg Simmel and Ferdinand de Saussure. These canonical thinkers understood language and money to be comparable because both were structural, abstract forms: for Simmel money was "colourless" and for Saussure language was "unmotivated" and the meaning of both was arrived at through the process of exchange, of selection and substitution. 15 Yet their writing about money also reveals a nagging resistance to this analogy, one which points to moments of anxiety in which money becomes socially differentiated and the conditions of its exchange become visible. It is these points, when the translation between money and language fails, that tell us most about the divergence of its embodiment of economic and cultural values.
The second part of the argument examines how these differentiated social meanings were realized in the work of key modernists, including Keynes and Woolf as well as Mansfield. I read Keynes's advocacy of a normative version of cosmopolitanism (which acknowledges money's social specificity and aims to realize it as, initially, a force capable of producing an equality between autonomous nation-states and latterly a defensive nationalism) against Woolf's more critical reading of these possibilities (her desire for a currency for a cosmopolitan "outsider society" that functions beyond the State).
The final section returns to the use of money in the work of Katherine Mansfield, examining how Mansfield's desire to find a commensurability between money's economic, cultural, and symbolic meanings is constantly frustrated by the dense and contradictory social spaces that-as an unmarried middle-class émigré woman-she occupied in the late 1910s. These difficulties offers insight into what this very strategy of re-embedding-which is becoming as prized by critical studies of finance as new economic criticism was by literary studies-itself denies and disavows. The implications 489 of re-embedding money, of giving it an alternative set of social meanings, are revealed to be far more contested than the critical vocabulary for them sometimes implies.
Money and Language
Between 1906 and 1911 Saussure gave the series of lectures which were to be published in 1916 as his Course in General Linguistics. In these lectures, Saussure infamously compared language to money because both were symbols of relational value without fixed or inherent meaning: "it is not the metal in a piece of money that fixes its value," Saussure noted, "a coin nominally worth five francs may contain half its worth of silver. Its value will vary according to the amount stamped upon it. This is even more true of the linguistic signifier" which is "constituted not by its material substance but by the differences that separate its sound-image from all others" (Course in General Linguistics, .
The nascent structuralism of Saussure's lectures echoed Simmel's slightly earlier 1903 The Philosophy of Money. If, for Saussure, language was like money, then for Simmel money was like language. It is an abstract and relational form, distinct from the physical presence of barter, because the former requires "fixed prices" that the latter makes "fluid": "relativity creates the value of objects in an objective sense, because only through relativity are things placed at a distance from the subject" (The Philosophy of Money, 124, 323, 126). Like Saussure, Simmel understood that this relational process involved a move from content (the particular note or word) to form and structure (the relational structure through which the note or word was given its abstracted meaning). The move from the specific and material to the general and abstract was integral to the dialectical ambivalence of modernity itself and allowed Simmel to confirm Marx's analysis of the reification of the general equivalent, money was "nothing but the pure form of exchangeability" (128). In essays such as "The Metropolis and Mental Life" Simmel is infamously explicit about the loss that the "[m]oney economy" has brought, "the reduction of qualitative values to quantitative ones" and the subsequent hollowing out of the "core of things, their individuality, their specific value, and their incomparability." 16 Yet when this abstracted money/language dyad is read against a rapidly changing international context it implicitly foregrounds the particularities of the specific and material forms of money that the parallel with language otherwise occludes. Saussure uses the metaphor of paper to describe the inextricability of the signifier from the signified (they are indivisible, one will remember, like two sides of a sheet of paper) but he uses the metaphor of the coin to describe the "arbitrary" and "different[ial]" functioning of language (Course in General Linguistics, 113, 115). This apparent reluctance to extend the metaphor of paper might, of course, be accidental but it might also be read against the different histories of the different monetary forms in Switzerland, where he was writing. Whereas the coins of the Confederation were stable, familiar, and encompassed the entire nation (in circulation since the 1850s, after replacing Switzerland's reliance on foreign coinage, when 8000 different coins had constituted 85 percent of the currency), paper money was not. 17 Indeed, Saussure's lectures were already underway when the 490 Swiss National Bank took the responsibility for printing banknotes out of the control of local banks and regions. Hence, for Saussure, standardized coins might have functioned like language, exchangeable and abstract, their value varying "according to the amount stamped upon" them but for bank notes, issued in very recent memory by a range of local banks and states, the relationship between value and authority, the processes that enabled abstraction, was less clear-cut. Eric Helleiner suggests that far from the "colourlessness" of Simmel's standard view of money, such local bank notes depicted "very localized landmarks, personalities, and historical events designed to enhance the trustworthiness of the note in a primarily local context" and he acknowledges that these meanings, which were attached to money that still functioned as money, complicates the disembedding upon which Simmel's economic sociology insisted. 18 Hence, rather than "bracketing" the relations of time and space, the very thing that money's abstraction is meant to achieve above all, the local Swiss notes still circulating when Saussure began his lectures required that attention be paid to them. 19 This brief detour through Swiss numismatics points, most obviously, to the importance of historical specificity: that money is as much the creature of the State as of the market and that the creation of a nationally standardized paper money, like the ending of the Gold Standard that it is inevitably associated with, was protracted and uneven and had different implications for writing in different moments and locations. This is indeed the point that has been made very carefully in Mary Poovey's history of the relationship (and, latterly, divorce) of writing and credit. 20 Yet the difference between early twentieth century Swiss banknotes and coins suggests not the "problematic of representation" of the kind that Poovey has rightly argued credit needs to deny in order to function; rather it points to the fact that money can function as money even when its value is no longer entirely abstracted, provided by its negative place in a structure, but when it is literalized, and its meanings are provided by specific political relations that are carried by its material form (Genres of the Credit Economy, 6).
This tension between the abstract and the specific that is only ever implicit in Saussure was, of course, much more central to Simmel's more consistently dialectical mode of thinking. Simmel understood that the "quantitative aspect of life" will always be "transformed directly into qualitative traits of character" and that the more impersonal the form, the more highly subjective and personal the character traits it can produce. The paradoxical trait that emerges from the "blasé" anonymity of the city's abstracting money economy, for example, is a highly subjective and individualized "inner life," and this life is, like that of money itself, an expansive one that "overflows by waves into a far-flung national or international area. . . . [t]he most significant characteristic of the metropolis is this functional extension beyond its physical boundaries" ("The Metropolis," 56).
Modernism and Cosmopolitanism
Simmel's attention to the possibilities of providing meaning for a community that exists beyond the nation-state, one that relies on structures rather than essences of identity, has recently been read against alternative models for cosmopolitanism. Janet Lyon, for example, reads him as a nascent advocate of an "agonistic cosmopolitics" she associates with more recent thinkers such as James Clifford and Bonnie Honig, one that expands the "conventional understanding of the term 'cosmopolitan' as a narrow descriptor of a class of people who have 'the security and privilege to move about in relatively unconstrained ways'" in order to include "populations whose global movements are more likely the result of . . . 'displacement and transplantation.'" 21 In Simmel's structuralism, Lyon finds a "radically anti-positivist proposal that a society is 'a structure which consists of beings who stand inside and outside of it at the same time,' . . . which is to say that there is no such thing as a pure insider (or outsider)"; she compares him to modernist writers who were seeking "to dislodge cosmopolitanism from its status as a universalism and to resettle it in the realm of the particular. . . . it serves to invoke intercultural forms of exchange that could or might be or shouldn't be, over and against (or in keeping with) the text's account of 'what is'" ("Cosmopolitanism and Modernism," 399, 397).
The tension Lyon notes between a normalizing cosmopolitanism that seeks a universalism of rights (which, as she suggests, can be easily lent to a defense of free trade imperialism) and an approach which critiques these very assumptions can be traced through the ways in which modernists such as Woolf and Keynes were thinking about the culturally produced meanings for money in the 1920s and 1930s. It was, of course, not Simmel but Keynes whose articulation of the contradiction between money's role as the controllable servant of a nationally bounded economy and as an amortizing universal equivalent insensitive to such differences most influenced the Bloomsbury modernists. 22 Keynes understood both the socially differentiated meanings of money and the particular difficulties that they suggested for imagining the new kind of world order that the aftermath of World War I demanded. He was acutely sensitive to the psychological differentiation of money in everyday life and his elucidation of the "money illusion" and "liquidity preference," for example, appearing in the 1910s, and given full articulation in The General Theory, describe the foundational importance that apparently irrational attachments to different money forms had in his work. 23 Nowhere was Keynes's awareness that money wasn't endlessly fungible-that exchange between monies was political and emotive rather than neutral and rational-more apparent than in his sensitivity to the role that the exchange of monies, specifically currency speculation, played in international relations. Keynes's knowledge of such speculation was, of course gained firsthand: he had left his first work in the Treasury (on the meanings of the gold standard in India) in order to trade international currencies to support the war effort, only resigning from the Treasury in disgust during the Versailles Peace negotiations. This disgust, embodied in his 1919 The Economic Consequences of the Peace, led him to vociferously lambast the Treaty's failures, infamously noting that "Lenin was certainly right. There is no subtler, no surer means of overturning the existing basis of society than to debauch the currency"; his critique spoke to the structural tensions between nationalism and cosmopolitanism that money represented and that the League of Nations failed to address. 24 He was cynical about 492 the contradictions of the "Wilsonian dogma" that yielded "the paradox that the first experiment in international government should exert its influence in the direction of intensifying nationalism." 25 Yet, as his own reflections on money in the 1930s indicate, Keynes's sensitivity to the social and psychological meanings of money only ever really fed a classically liberal understanding of cosmopolitanism. His defense of free trade in the 1910s and 1920s, for example, "not only as an economic doctrine which a rational and instructed person could not doubt, but almost as a part of the moral law" that provided "the explanation before man and the justification before Heaven of [Britain's] economic supremacy," can clearly be read against Arrighi's description of the importance of the City of London to Pax Britannica. 26 And when Keynes begins to doubt this position in the 1930s, arguing that "domestic policies [notably the quest for full employment] might often be easier to compass, if the phenomenon known as 'the flight of capital' could be ruled out" and that although "ideas, knowledge, science, hospitality, travel" are things "which should of their nature be international" but "finance" should "be primarily national," he is speaking as much to the effects of the Depression, and Britain's rapidly declining international status, as to a more radical critique of free trade imperialism ("National Self-Sufficiency," 757).
There are, then, differing views as to what meaning to give the shift in Keynes's thinking that occurred in the early 1930s. Bill Maurer, for example, reads his vision of a postwar international currency-the "bancor" that Keynes attempted, but failed, to enshrine in the 1944 Bretton Woods Agreement-through the modernist aesthetics of the Bloomsbury group in ways that attribute to it a critical interrogation of a universalizing cosmopolitanism. Maurer compares the "uncertainty" that Keynes's work on probability allowed into monetary policy with the "vertigo of [Duncan] Grant's play with enframing devices" and suggests that in both "inside, outside, frame and world dissolve into each other and resolve into new patterns, depending on the position of the spectator and movement through space-time." 27 Yet, perhaps more plausibly, critics such as Patrick Brantlinger and Joshua Esty have described the ways in which Keynes had, by the 1930s, also begun his retreat into the protective horizon of the bounded nation-state, relinquishing the possibility of a more radical cosmopolitan order. Esty argues that "The General Theory revives an older idea of concrete, bounded economic communities in order to invent new rules for survival in the world of abstract, international finance capitalism," and Patrick Brantlinger argues that Keynes's nationalistic pragmatism limited his ability to realize the "cultured, perhaps utopian internationalism" that he had hitherto at least partially shared with the Bloomsbury group (Esty, "National Objects," 8; Brantlinger, Fictions, 223). Hence, by the 1930s, Keynes's attention to the social nature of money, his insistence on it as a phenomenon that gains its meaning from the qualitative relations of the social rather than from a quantified abstraction of the social, were placed in the service of the nation-state in precisely the ways that he had questioned in 1919.
Brantlinger offers as a more radical counterpoint to The General Theory Woolf's 1938 Three Guineas, which was much more resolutely anti-imperialist and anti-state.
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In this text, Woolf uses the symbol of money to critique not only money's assumed exchangeability, but also its very conflation with the relations of an imperialist capitalism. Three Guineas uses the social differentiation of coins as a profoundly ironical vehicle for its scathing attack on the amortizing rationality of patriarchal capitalism; in this book, coins are not standardized forms, or even synecdoches for capitalism or finance, but rather objects and ideas freighted with both cultural histories and new possibilities.
The eponymous guinea, for example, was not actually currency at all by the time Woolf was writing; the term was both aristocratic and anachronistic. It had been replaced by the pound in a re-coinage of 1816 and the twenty-one shillings that the word continued to denote had become primarily a marker of class: only land, horses, and art continued to be calculated in guineas whilst tradespeople and servants were paid in pounds. Against this shibboleth of inherited privilege, Woolf places the transformational "sixpence" that she associates with the 1919 Sex Disqualification Removal Act: "in every purse there was, or might be, one bright new sixpence in whose light every thought, every sight, action looked different." 28 Woolf deems the sixpence a "sacred coin" for the "educated man's daughter" and suggests that "the moon even, scarred as it is in fact with forgotten craters, seemed to her to be a white sixpence, a chaste sixpence, an altar upon which she vowed never to side with the servile, the signers-on" (Three Guineas, 16). The sixpence is hyperbolically feminized in these descriptions because it represents not money but the possibility of a new kind of politics, a politics, somewhat paradoxically, "from which the money element has been removed. She need no longer use her charm to procure money from her father or brother. Since it is beyond the power of her family to punish her financially she can express her own opinions" (17).
Woolf's use of money against the money economy accords with the stories that economic anthropology has provided for money in the modernist period. Viviana Zelizer's account of the meaning of money between 1870-1930, for example, poses itself against a Simmelian sociology that "clings to the view of money as an absolutely fungible, qualitatively neutral, infinitely divisible, entirely homogenous medium of market exchange," suggesting that this view failed to notice the "invention of new monies or recognize the wide varieties of currencies in modern society" and failed to capture "a growing paradox: as the physical forms and legal status of money became more standardized, the use of legal tender in many areas of life turned into a more delicate social process, making cultural and social differentiation increasingly elaborate." 29 This process of social differentiation, which re-embeds money in social life, she goes on to argue, is "pervasive," existing not only "in the dark exotic corners of the economy but everywhere we look, different kinds of social relations and values reshape monies. Not just individuals but organizations and even governments distinguish among different forms of legal tender or other monies" (The Social Meaning, 200).
Zelizer is concerned with the ways in which women's changing social roles were reflected in their differentiation of money, as they distinguished between earned money, given money, food money, and gift money. A more pointed example of this reshaping of money's meanings, one that directly challenged it as only an abstract indicator of value, can be found in money's deployment by the suffragette movement of the late 1910s. 30 Such coins offer an obviously gendered critique of the State's denial of universal suffrage: the King's "elegant profile" is defaced whilst the feminized image of Britannia is left untouched. The coins belong in a tradition of "money art" that exploits the coexistence of money's apparently invisible anonymity (the abstract exchange value that ensures the coins can circulate despite their defacement and thus makes their political message difficult to regulate or capture) with the material and symbolic meanings that their physical existence also produces. Indeed, as one curator of the British Museum has informally suggested, the coins may have acted as an advert for the suffragettes' own publications (their pamphlet Votes for Women sold for a penny) as well as a critique of the state's denial of their representation.
The sixpence is reclaimed by Woolf, just as the penny had been by the Suffragettes, in order to resist the state capitalism that it also represents. When Woolf rhetorically asks how women can use the sixpence, "this new weapon . . . to prevent war," she differentiates between it and the guinea on more than monetary value: "if our point of view is the same as yours then we must add our sixpence to your guinea: follow your methods and repeat your words. But, whether fortunately or unfortunately, that is not true" (Three Guineas, 17). The sixpence is, importantly, not spent: instead it is used to denote a critical practice that stands outside of the ceremonies and assumptions of the patriarchal state:
It falls to us now to go on thinking: how are we to spend that sixpence? Think we must. Let us think in offices; in omnibuses; while we are standing in the crowd watching Coronations and Lord Mayor's Shows; let us think as we pass the Cenotaph; and in Whitehall; in the gallery of the House of Commons; in the Law Courts; let us think at baptisms and marriages and funerals. Let us never cease from thinking-what is this "civilization" in which we find ourselves? What are these ceremonies and why should we take part in them? (62) (63) The unspent sixpence might be imagined as a currency for Woolf's "Outsiders' Society," a society Rebecca Walkowitz describes as modernism's "critical cosmopolitanism" that reflects not only on cosmopolitanism's own "history, uses, and interests," including its role in supporting free trade and imperialism, but also on the "analytic postures" of the critical gesture itself, in which "a commitment to collective agency may be a style rather than an index of transnational politics" (106). 31 The description of the unspent sixpence in Three Guineas might correspond with a style that rejects "the consistency and intensity of affect" that "imperial progress" demands and refuses both the logic of replacement and the logic of equivalence in order to produce an "entanglement" (Cosmopolitan Style, 104, 103). Woolf's point, Walkowitz suggests, "is not simply to create a new ideal of attentiveness, more expansive and extensive, but to display the customs and conventions, social and psychological, that control what can be seen and what can be said" (83). Of course, not all of Woolf's coins went unspent and numerous scholars have made evident the ways in which her view of money was also shaped through the selfconsciously gendered and politicized practices of consumption. Like the Suffragettes, Woolf understood consumption as offering a potentially political and deeply gendered form of political leverage; as Michael Tratner most baldly put it, "Three Guineas is built on consumerist principles, presenting a plan of spending guineas as a methodology for ending war." 32 Yet, as Jessica Berman has made clear, this support of consumerism was deeply bound up with Woolf's gendered support of internationalism. Berman makes clear that the Woolfs diverged from the Fabians, Trade Unions, and Co-Operative Guild movements because these groups failed to entirely disassociate themselves from what the Woolfs understood to be a masculine and imperialist nationalism. In their place, Berman suggests, Woolf supported the more contingent and yet radical politics of the Women's Co-operative Guild, which effaced the divisions between nations, classes, and even public and private. Berman traces a line from Woolf's identification with the WCG's symbolic "Woman with the Market Basket" to the "possibility of community not only without charismatic leaders but also without any structure like that of state, nation, or party" offered by The Waves. 33 Hence, although both Woolf and Keynes shared a complex view of money, as embodying social as well as economic meanings in contradictory and even potentially critical ways, they drew quite different conclusions from this. Although heretical in so many ways, Keynes was always primarily a British economist and his understanding of the meaning of money's plastic, psychological, and deeply political forms was always dependent on what he felt the British economy needed. His was a view of money as a contingent and malleable form that could lend itself to the very different politics of free trade, of the radical possibilities of the bancor, and of protective tariffs. For Woolf, conversely, these malleable social meanings of money offered themselves as a currency for an alternative model of a cosmopolitan society capable of critiquing these economies; for Woolf, both spending and not spending money were deeply political acts for the self-consciously critical middle-class woman.
The Mine of Katherine Mansfield
The work of Katherine Mansfield also uses money, both its abstraction and its simultaneous resistance to abstraction, to critique the normative assumptions of a cosmopolitan order. Yet in calling attention to the failure of this cosmopolitan aspiration, foregrounding instances in which money's endless movement is interrupted, this work enables us to reflect on the social and political costs of this aspiration. The significance of this argument, and the distinctions between the positions that these writers held, are perhaps best understood by a return to an account to the critical social theories of money with which I began. Mansfield's inability to offer a new set of new social meanings for money, meanings that can resist or reinterpret its position in a market economy, can be read against the tensions that Martjin Konings has identified as existing within a Polanynian reappropriation necessarily "caught between the contextual character 496 of social meaning and the objectivity of monetary value" (Emotional Logic, 17). The "critique of idolatry" that Konings suggests motivates these reappropriations of money requires one, he suggests, "to recognize the irrational nature of our attachments; it pushes us to see that we can bring the outside force back down to earth, re-embed what has become disembedded" (18, 19) . Yet, as Konings also recognizes, this is a complex move because "the symbol that is at the very heart of capitalist society resists this logic"; he suggests that rather than become "entangled in the logic of the trade-off" that this contradiction involves, we should "more fully expose and appreciate it" (19, 18) . For Konings this means acknowledging the fact that "the modern subject often employs its reflexive capacities not to transform its own relation to the iconic sign," to radically change the meaning of its economic relationship with money, for example, but rather to disavow it through "a fantasy of a corrupted other that prevents the sign from operating in the proper way and delivering on its redemptive promises. In other words, idolatry critique becomes a technique of narcissism" (7). Mansfield's struggle to reappropriate money, I suggest, gives us access to the implications of this idolatry critique, to the disavowal of the subject's continued relationship to money that resides in a displaced "fantasy of a corrupted other." Mansfield was the third daughter of a middle-class New Zealand family, born to a privileged and yet provincial life. On returning to New Zealand at seventeen, after four years of a liberal London education, Mansfield despaired of what she described as the "Suitable Appropriate Existence" her parents were imagining for her, "the days full of perpetual Society functions, the hours full of clothes discussion, the waste of life. . . . The days, weeks, months, years of it all. Her father, with his successful characteristic respectable face, crying 'Now is the time. What have I got for my money? Come along, deck yourself out, show the world that you are expensive.'" 34 Mansfield did not allow herself to be spent so simply; she wrested herself from this display of her father's wealth and returned to London, supported by a small allowance, and embarked on the itinerant life not untypical of the modernist writer, traveling between European cities and being accepted by, most notably, D. H. and Frieda Lawrence and the Bloomsbury and Morrell coteries.
Mansfield's relationship to these communities was complex. With Lawrence and, to a lesser extent, Woolf, she shared intense but mistrustful friendships. Mansfield's political ambitions were, however, more diffident. Although her initial London associates had included women's rights activists such as Beatrice Hastings and thinkers interested in rethinking the money question, such as A. R. Orage (who was a key contributor to C. H. Douglas's work on Social Credit), Mansfield was less overtly interested in the relationship between the political and the aesthetic than many of her contemporaries. 35 Her biographers assign different meanings to her reluctance to engage with the political in these early London years, when she was still relatively unencumbered by the illnesses that would narrow her world so severely. Claire Tomalin, for example, describes Mansfield's account of attending a suffragette meeting and suggests that the "mixture of solemnity and shabbiness was too much for her" and her well-honed sense of aesthetic pleasure, whereas the rather more sympathetic Jeffrey Meyers describes Mansfield's 497 sense of exclusion from the political life of London, her description of herself as a "little Colonial walking in the London garden patch-allowed to look, perhaps, but not to linger" (Tomalin, Katherine Mansfield, 58). 36 The sense of exclusion from a well-codified but only partially understood social order is a familiar one in much of Mansfield's fiction, especially that written in the immediate context of her own difficult travels across Europe during the war. It is a feeling that is often highlighted in the recurring stories of travel, by the English hot plates served at nervous foreign lunches, by the brown soap on boats that would not lather, by the surprisingly empty salles à manger in grand hotels, which reveal travel to be a site of awkward confusion and disappointment. The most pointed of these difficulties often involve handling money-knowing when to pay, when not to pay, how much to pay, and what money to pay with. Mansfield's acute awareness of the particular vulnerabilities of the independent female traveler, in particular, fuel her descriptions of cosmopolitanism as an ideal that she both desperately seeks and yet is continually frustrated by. Money fails in such contexts not because it enacts the exchange that renders the specific general-because it loses its "local garbs" and erases meaning-but because it doesn't, because the tensions between its economic, symbolic and cultural values cannot be easily calculated. It is in Mansfield's careful attention to the interstices between these registers that the subtle but disruptive plays of power-of class, race, and gender-can be discerned.
In "A Dill Pickle" from Bliss, for example, the assertion of a literal equation between price and value is revealed to be a solipsistic act of power that destroys the possibility of reciprocity. In the story an impoverished woman meets a now rich ex-lover who has gone on to fulfil their shared fantasies of travel, has "been to all those places that we talked of, and stayed in them long enough to-as you used to say-'air oneself in them.' . . . 'it has been,' he said, 'very wonderful.'" 37 His description of the shared dill pickle, eaten at night by the "mysteriously Black Sea, black as velvet," allows them to momentarily conjure a shared memory of a future that only he experienced, but it quickly fragments as they recall different accounts of a Christmas spent together ("A Dill Pickle," 234). He remembers being "listened" to, that her witnessing of his stories of his unhappy childhood was so acute that he had felt as if she "had even made the little Christmas tree listen, as in a fairy story." She, conversely, remembers eating a "little pot of caviare" that had cost "seven and sixpence" and that he had been both "delighted and shocked" by the act (235). Yet that his sense of transgression related to the literalism of price ("[n]o, really, that is eating money. You could not get seven shillings into a little pot that size") destroys the potential eroticism of the memory (235-36). His literalism, acknowledged by his fear that he has turned into "a sort of barbarian" without her, becomes evident in his inability to read her current plight and the romantic possibilities that she senses in their meeting (237). At the end of the story he is "thunder-struck, astounded beyond words" when she, feeling his rejection, leaves without explanation; he can only recuperate the sense of loss that this involves by asking "the waitress for his bill" but being careful to exclude her from his calculations: "'But the cream has not been touched,' he [says], 'please do not charge me for it'" (238).
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"The Little Governess" also narrates a failure to understand cultural difference through the untranslatability of money's economic and cultural meanings. The Governess is initially excited by travel: "it had been nice in the Ladies Cabin. The stewardess was so kind and changed her money for her and tucked up her feet. She lay on one of the hard pink-sprigged couches and watched the other passengers, friendly and natural. . . . 'I like travelling very much' thought the little governess." 38 Mansfield's sardonic critique of the young woman's naïveté is heavy both in the childish register assigned to her thoughts and her diminutive title. This critique continues, although the tone becomes darker and more equivocal: the Governess refuses to pay the porter his "fare" ("did he imagine that she was going to give him a franc for playing a trick like that[?]") and he bundles an old man into her carriage who causes her to lose the position for which she has traveled, leaving her abandoned in a foreign city, without connection or reputation ("The Little Governess," 242). The Governess fails not only to understand the value of the money which she had so carelessly exchanged but also, more importantly, her own fragile status within the economy that it suggests; she adopts instead a hubristic high-handedness that allows her to misread her own class status: "she looked out from her safe corner, frightened no longer but proud that she had not given that franc" (243). This unspent franc is very different from Woolf's unspent sixpence: whereas the latter represents a new kind of class-conscious collectivity for the woman worker and consumer, the former represents their misunderstood powerlessness.
Mansfield's writing about her own money in her letters and her journals suggests that she coded her awareness of her liminal position and lack of choices-as both insider and outsider within the metropolitan center, as both privileged and yet dependent within the gender-class system-through the language of money. When she was experiencing the longing for home from which The Prelude (1918) (one of the Woolfs' Hogarth Press's first books) emerged, she imaginatively reconfigures both the provincialism and privilege of her childhood. In part of a characteristically upbeat but strained correspondence with Ottoline Morrell she compares the English seaside to the "wild untamed water that beats about my own forlorn island" and yet quickly brings herself short, asking "why on earth" she should "call it 'forlorn'" when [m] y bank Manager assures me that it's a perfect little gold mine and whenever I go down to the Bank of New Zealand I turn over a heap of illustrated papers full of pictures of electric trains and American buildings and fashionable ladies and gentlemen who might have walked out of the Piccadilly Grill. . . . But all that sham and vulgarity is hard to believe in: I don't believe in it all. There is another side that you would believe in too. Ah, my dear, I know the most heavenly places that cannot be spoiled-and that I shall go back to as surely as if they were "Dixie." And I shall think of you, and wish to God I expect that I were sitting opposite you at the Maison Lyons! Life is a queer, a damn queer business!
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The association of money with the natural ("it's a gold mine") is lost once it enters into culture (the "illustrated papers full of pictures"). New Zealand's new wealth is a "sham" that she refuses to "believe in," retaining instead an idealized notion of it as a heaven that "cannot be spoiled" (it is not unlikely that Manfield is here thinking of the trip that she took, shortly before leaving the continent, to the New Zealand wilderness in which she spent time with Maoris). The culture that wealth has produced in New Zealand is decidedly that of the New World, "electric trains and American buildings," and that this is a conservative version of modernity that troubles Mansfield is implicit as she compares it to "Dixie" (the American Confederacy reputedly named, probably incidentally, after the French term for a ten-dollar bill). Mansfield thus quickly distances herself from her own fantasy. The fantasies that are present in the tensions and between the cultural New World of paper and the natural Old World of gold are reconciled in the figurative description of the London summer afternoon that immediately follows this paragraph in the same letter. The gold mines are replaced by the "golden day" and the lost wilderness of New Zealand by the "yellow lilies" and "big soft spots of sunlight" that are reflected on the studio walls, and the letter ends with a carefully described image of harmonious contentment. 40 Yet in a letter written only a month later Mansfield chafes against her financial position in ways that problematize her attempt to both disavow and displace the tensions between Old World gold and New World paper. In this letter Mansfield "confounds" her "poverty" and longs not for the untouched (and uneconomic) wilderness of home but for the privileges her father's wealth afforded her there, "an exquisite room, absolute privacy, a devoted black woman, and some ravishing perfume. And I've been groaning for half an hour about having to pay the window cleaner four and sixpence!" 41 Mansfield's rendering of this racially-coded privilege makes explicit what was only implicit in her earlier letter: the money she most wants, the money which she no longer has, is the money of Old World gold, a money which, in the America to which she alludes, has been coded with the invisible privileges of whiteness. 42 This is a form of money that bestows a privilege beyond its value, a racialized privilege that can distance Mansfield from the world of literal payment that the window cleaner's bill for four and sixpence demands she acknowledge. The complexities of Mansfield's account of herself as an artist who has rejected the "sham" paper money of her father in favor of the "golden" wealth of a London afternoon are revealed here: Mansfield's re-embedding of a social meaning for money, to use Koning's Polanyian vocabulary, occurs through a problematic disavowal of her own racialized class position in relation to it.
This complex awareness in Mansfield of her own privileged relationship to the particular invisibility of a money codified by race is also evident in one of her most striking stories of this period, "Je Ne Parle Pas Francais" (1918) . In it, the Wildean character Raoul Duquette retrospectively narrates a brief but puzzling liaison with an English man, Dick, who brings his fiancée, Mouse, to Paris and immediately abandons her there. 43 move" echoes False Coins, the title of the literary work that Duquette had sent to Dick on their first meeting and the coincidence in this context rings with the translator's fear of the "faux amis" (the false friends) of words that sound similar but have different meanings in different languages. The possibility returns us to the analogy between money and language, but it does so through a reverse logic that sees language, like money, fail to be properly exchanged. The phenomena of "faux amis" are so feared by the translator, as Emily Apter has argued, because "homonymy destabilizes translation in its very structure" and allows the possibility of untranslatability, an "impassive condition that would seem to nest in language; sometimes discernible as a pull away from language norming." 46 The failure of exchange that Mouse's abandonment signals, which gives the story its title, haunts Duquette's from the start of its retrospective narrative. His self-congratulatory account of himself as the guardian of a dystopian cosmopolitanism in the opening pages, for example, is disrupted by it: as he sits in the café, relishing his own cinematic phrasing and taking in "girls'" names and dirty jokes, his eyes fall "quite suddenly, at the bottom of the page, written in green ink" to that "stupid, stale little phrase; Je ne parle pas français. There! It had come-the moment-the geste! And although I was so ready, it caught me, it tumbled me over; I was simply overwhelmed. And the physical feeling was so curious, so particular" ("Je Ne Parle," 76). Duquette tries to recuperate the "Agony, Agony, Agony" that this refusal causes him as he "simply dissolve[s], melt[s], turn[s] into water" in the face of it, by presenting his pain as evidence of artistic sensibility: "And up I puffed and puffed, blowing off finally with: After all I must be first-rate. No second-rate mind could have experienced such intensity of feeling" (76, 77). Yet the pretension is short-lived. He repeats the phrase twice as he admits that his "other self" still seeks Mouse and is "chasing up and down out in the dark there" (78).
It is in an attempt to shore up this "melting" and "lost" self, to reassure himself of himself, that Duquette, finally, formally introduces himself to the reader several pages into the story: "My name is Raoul Duquette. I am twenty-six years old and a Parisian, a true Parisian . . . I have no family; I don't want any. I never think about my childhood. I've forgotten it" (79). The single defining memory that he offers of his childhood is of an "African laundress" who "took me into a little outhouse . . . caught me up in her arms and began kissing me. Ah, those kisses!" (82, 79-80). Duquette is given a different kind of false coin, a "little round fried cake covered with sugar," in recompense for the act and although both the act and the payment are self-consciously rendered "prettily," they nonetheless represent the pained loss of innocence from which the adult narrator is constituted: "from that very first afternoon," he recalls, "my childhood was 'kissed away.' I became very languid, very caressing, and greedy beyond measure" (80).
The story is a deeply ambivalent performance of Duquette's identification with Mouse. It is a story that most obviously allows him to explain that he, like her, has suffered a ruin that rendered him impassive, "languid" and "caressing" and adrift without family or connections in Paris. The story also serves as a code for his non-literary career, for the fate that Mouse potentially faces, as he admits that, even now, if he ever finds himself "in need of right-down cash-well, there's always an African laundress and an 502 outhouse, and I am very frank and bon enfant about plenty of sugar on the little fried cake afterwards" (82). But it is also a story that functions to conceal the significance of his own abandonment of Mouse, the fact that he is, finally, revealed to be more like Dick than he is like her. Indeed, the ending of the story suggests that Duquette has turned his understanding of her pain into a transaction from which he can benefit in ways that reveal the true depth of his corruption. "When the piano starts playing a 'mouse' tune," he suggests, he indulges in a reverie of reconciliation that is interrupted only when "some dirty old gallant comes up" to his table and he can promise him that he has "the little girl for you, mon vieux. So little . . . so tiny" (114). "Je Ne Parle Pas Francais" allows Mansfield to explore how both the cultural meanings of monetary exchange, and the asymmetrical economic relationships that it both relies upon and produces, are maintained by an interplay of denials and recognitions that are as psychic as they are economic. Mansfield's deeply liminal narrator-white but with "olive skin," male but "plump, almost like a girl," a prostitute but also a procurer of women-suggests not only the powerlessness of the exchanged and the power of the exchanger but Mansfield's own complex identification with both positions as she constantly struggles to reconcile the contradictions that her race, class, and gender suggest (82, 83). The subtle interplay between these identities can be discerned in the disturbing racial economies of this story in ways that speak directly to Mansfield's complex coding, and disavowal, of her relationship to money. Duquette's dependency upon his "African laundress" and Mansfield's longing for her "devoted Black woman," for example, could not be more different from one another: the former is fulfilled, in libidinously insistent and financially "frank" terms, whereas the latter remains repressed on all counts, passed over as a fantasy of wealth that has been relinquished in favor of the untrammeled life of the artist. Yet it is hard not to read one through the other, as Mansfield's problematic desire for an evasion of the relations of the money economy to which she remains so necessarily bound is uncannily returned in the "hyper-disruptive" presence of the African laundress who makes explicit that which Mansfield cannot-the fact that both her power and her powerlessness are framed through the intersections between libidinal and monetary economy. 47 It is a fitting coda to "Je Ne Parle Pas Francais" that its accounts of the difficulties of translation and exchange should be evident in its own history. Mansfield's ill health had again sent her abroad after the completion of the story and Murry was negotiating with her publisher on her behalf. He recommends that she accepts the cuts to her story that the publisher has proposed because "you will gain a good deal more than you will lose by retaining them" and justifies the decision by appealing to her "exquisite talent" which can be "appreciated by many more people than will appreciate the actual art" and cites his own lower-middle-class mother as a defense: "She will love those stories, I know & I'm sure there are thousands like her." 48 Mansfield's initial hostility to the idea passes within the space of a day; she needs the money and the censored version of the story is still the one that continues to circulate. It is hard not to read this as repeating the narrative of the story itself, as Mansfield, in need of money and short of friends, acquiesces to Murry's judgment even though to do so betrays her vision of the work in visceral, even oedipal ways ("Shall I pick out the eyes of a story for £40" she asks Murry in fury). Murry, in some senses, continues his war work-as translator and then as Chief Censor-as he continues to control the way in which Mansfield herself can circulate. The modernist treatment of money was, then, consistently a diffident and complex one: far from treating money as an entirely abstracted form of exchange modernists as different from one another as Keynes, Woolf, and Mansfield were all sensitive to its material and cultural meanings and the ways in which they intersected and interrupted its obviously economic and normative authority. Yet Mansfield's treatment of money, in both her personal and fictional writing, reveals that the possibility that money was necessarily available for reappropriation to be something of a fantasy. Instead, Mansfield offers us an account of money's failure to move, a vision of a subtle politics that draws attention to the fact that sometimes the differences between money's economic, symbolic, and cultural articulations makes exchange itself impossible.
Notes

